Letters on evil (part 3)
Where our correspondents realize they're not going to be friends. One wants to end the exchange, the other relentlessly keeps on going
You can read part 1 and part 2 of this correspondence of a total of eight letters between the grain merchant Van Blijenbergh and lens grinder/philosopher Spinoza.
I'm trying not to veer too much in Jonathan Bennett's territory and try to keep these short rather than rewording all details.
For the present exchange, I feel a lot of sympathy for Van Blijenbergh in letter 5. It's always good to be open about the principles you use in philosophizing, and he didn't expect to get such condescending and veering on the rude reply. Poor Willem! Anyway, here are letters 5 and 6. It feels a little painful to read sometimes… (To me it seems like Van Blijenbergh is selling himself short and his insistence to continue does indicate he's more of a philosopher than he gives himself credit).
Will our two intrepid philosophers meet in person, as is indicated in the letters? You'll find out in the final installment soon.
Letter 5, Van Blijenbergh to Spinoza, Feb 19 1665, Dordrecht
Sir and worthy friend,
I didn't quite know how to reply to your letter from January 28. In your first letter to me you offered friendship in a resolute manner, and you encouraged me to be free in formulating objections. So I was expecting a friendly reply. However, your last letter wasn't very friendly. You even said we wouldn’t be able to learn anything from each other. I never thought I would offend you by simply stating my objections.
Thank you for your letters, especially the second. I am still seeking clarification on some matters. If I don't understand something, that should not be a source of annoyance to you. Do I understand correctly that according to you, someone's nature is nothing more than what they are doing? For example, if I am lustful now, it's part of my nature; if I'm not, then it's not part of my nature. If someone commits crimes, then they necessarily do so because according to their nature, they could not do otherwise. The righteous person who acts virtuously does so because God's power wanted them to do so. Am I right in stating your position like this?
But then, I don't see what difference there is between a godless and a pious person, since they both serve God according to you. Now, you say the pious person becomes more perfect in doing so, but what is perfection in your view?
What's the difference in giving alms or beating someone to death? Are both equally pleasing to God in your view? If yes, what would motivate me to act virtuously? You say you act out of love of virtue, but what is virtue according to you? I'd also love to pick your brain about free will, which Descartes accepts but you deny. If our actions are so dependent on God, are beings with reason dependent on God in a different way from senseless beings, such as stones?
I'd love to ask you many more questions, but I'll leave it at this. Also, I need to travel to Leiden in a few weeks. Then, if you don't mind, I'd love to come and visit you.
Trusting in this, kind regards, I remain your faithful servant,
W.V. Blijenbergh
PS: In haste, I forgot to ask, if you can foresee something could you prevent it from happening?
Letter 6, Spinoza to Van Blijenbergh, March 13, 1665, Dordrecht
Sir and friend,
In your last letter, you expressed the hope you'd remain steadfast in your faith. This is why I thought there's no point in continuing this correspondence. I'm busy and I'd rather continue my studies. In my first letter, I had assumed you were a real philosopher, only using your reason and not theology as the measure of truth. But you told me in that second letter that wasn't the case, so the foundation of friendship I thought we had wasn't what I thought it was. You shouldn't be offended by the rest of my reply, as this is just how we philosophically discuss and it doesn't violate the norms of politeness.
Now for your objections. If you can show to me that evil is something that exists, then yes, I would fully admit that according to me, God is the cause of crimes, evil, etc. But I think I've shown that evil is not something that exists. Take Nero's murder of his mother. This was just something that happened, and Nero showed with it his lack of gratitude, disobedience, and lack of charity. These properties (of disobedience etc) are things we say to evaluate, but they do not factually exist. God caused the deed, but didn't cause these properties because they do not exist.
As philosophers, we should not talk the way theologians do, where God is conceived as a perfect being. In theology, you can say God wants something, or that God feels sadness at the deeds of the godless and is pleased by the deeds of the pious. But in philosophy, you can't attribute human characteristics to God like this.
I will also reply to your question of whether the deeds of the pious and godless flow with equal necessity from God's laws: yes, this is the case. Still, things differ from each other, not just in gradation but also in kind. A mouse and an angel are both equally dependent on God, but a mouse is not an angel. Here I believe I've answered your objections.
As for your questions: about whether beating to death is just as pleasing to God as giving alms. I don't know what pleasing to God means. Does it mean God hates one person and loves another? Or that one has not given something to God and the other has? I answer no. But if you wonder if the killer and almsgiver are equally perfect, I answer again: no. In my Ethics, which I still haven't managed to publish, I show that this longing for virtue in the righteous springs with necessity from the clear knowledge they have of themselves and God.
About your final question, well, you can ask a hundred an hour like that without reaching any conclusions. And since you don't insist on an answer, I will leave it unanswered. You are very welcome at my place. Let me know in advance when you come. I hope it will be soon, as I will go to Amsterdam soon for a week or two.
Meanwhile I remain, with kind regards, your righteous friend and servant,
B. de Spinoza
Fascinating. It is starting to sound like the Luther-Erasmus debate, with Spinoza playing the role of Luther.
This point by Spinoza gets at the heart of his view: "In my Ethics, which I still haven't managed to publish, I show that this longing for virtue in the righteous springs with necessity from the clear knowledge they have of themselves and God."
Good action is the result of knowledge, and follows necessarily from it. In this way good action and necessity are compatible.
A consequence seems to be that all bad action is involuntary or the result of ignorance. If evil is equated with blameworthy action, and ignorance mitigates blame, one could say that moral evil is illusory, explicable if we knew more about the agent's situation, motives, and history.
Or perhaps it could be reframed to say that there is no such thing as real ignorance, only less knowledge. The less knowledge they have the less likely their actions are good, except accidentally, since good action “springs from clear knowledge of themselves and God”.
Ignorance then is all the blank spaces, all the imperfection or holes in knowledge within people. Think of a window that is caked in dirt; on one side is the sun (representing knowledge) but its light is blocked in whole or part by the dirt on the window; on the other side is the “ignorant” person who is in the shadow of the window.
When a spot on the window is cleaned, that opens the way to some knowledge. As more of the window is cleaned, knowledge and understanding increases.
So is a person blameworthy if they refuse to clean even a spot on the window, or they may even prefer to cover up a clean spot to block light since knowing brings discomfort or unwanted responsibility. Does ignorance still mitigate blame? Where does the will to act fit in, or does even that depend on knowledge or its absence?